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INTRODUCTION
In a June 3, 2002 opinion authored by Justice Scalia, the United States Supreme
Court held in Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc.,' that when a
claim of patent infringement is asserted in a defendant's counterclaim rather than in
a plaintiffs complaint, the patent infringement counterclaim cannot serve as the
basis for a U.S. District Court's "arising under any Act of Congress relating to
patents" jurisdiction as defined by 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) [hereinafter, § 1338 "arising
under" jurisdiction]. Consequently, such a case does not trigger the patent-specific
appellate subject matter jurisdiction of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a).2 Rather, appeal will be directed to the regional
U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the geographic jurisdiction in which the case was
tried. For example, if a plaintiff asserts a Sherman Act § 2 monopolization claim in a
lawsuit filed in the U.S. District Court for the District of Kansas and the antitrust
defendant answers by filing a counterclaim asserting patent infringement (as was
the case in the closely-watched CSU v. Xerox litigation3), the district court's final
decision will now be appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
rather than to the Federal Circuit.
This result is obtained under Holmes Group even though the patent
infringement counterclaim is compulsory rather than permissive. Recall that under
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a "compulsory" counterclaim is one that "arises
out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's
claim and does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom
the court cannot acquire jurisdiction." 4
These counterclaims are deemed
"compulsory" because a pleading "shall state" such counterclaims as the pleader has
* Associate Professor, The John Marshall Law School, Chicago, Illinois. The author welcomes
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U.S.-, 122 S. Ct. 1889, 153 L. Ed. 2d 13, 2002 U.S. LEXIS 4022, 70 U.S.L.W. 4489 (June 3,

2002).
2 The Federal Circuit's appellate jurisdiction is defined by 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a), which provides
that the court shall have exclusive jurisdiction "(1) of an appeal from a final decision of a district
court of the United States ... , if the jurisdiction of that court was based, in whole or in part, on
section 1338 of this title ....
Section 1338 of 28 U.S.C. in turn provides in relevant part that the
federal district courts, exclusive of state courts, shall have original jurisdiction "(a) ... of any civil
action arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents .... "
3 The Holmes Group decision puts an end to the Federal Circuit's prior practice of taking
appellate jurisdiction in antitrust cases in which patent infringement is raised as a counterclaim.
See, e.g., In re Independent Serv. Organizations Antitrust Litigation (CSU, L.L.C. v. Xerox Corp.),
203 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (deciding appeal of case in which plaintiff alleged violation of
Sherman Act and defendant counterclaimed for patent and copyright infringement).
4 Fed. R. Civ. P. 13(a).
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against any opposing party at the time of serving the pleading.5 In contrast, a
"permissive" counterclaim is one that does not arise out of the same transaction or
occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's claimi.6 Although
disputed by the parties, the Supreme Court characterized the patent infringement
counterclaim in Holmes Group as compulsory. 7
Therefore, even when an
independent jurisdictional basis exists under 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) for the patent
infringement allegation of the counterclaim, Holmes Group means that the matter
will not be resolved by the Federal Circuit.
In holding that cases involving patent infringement counterclaims must
henceforth be appealed to the regional Circuits, the Supreme Court in Holmes Group
overruled contrary Federal Circuit decisions in Aerojet-General Corp. v. Machine
Tool Works8 and DSC Communications Corp. v. Pulse Communications,Inc.9 These
decisions (characterized by concurring Justice Stevens as "well-reasoned
precedent")1 established that the Federal Circuit had appellate jurisdiction over
appeals from cases involving patent infringement counterclaims, whether compulsory
or permissive.
In particular, Aerojet effectively interpreted the "well-pleaded
complaint" rule of Christianson v. Colt Indus.,1 the Supreme Court's initial foray
into Federal Circuit jurisdiction, as a rule of "well-pleaded complaint or
counterclaim." Writing for a unanimous Federal Circuit in Aerojet, then-Chief Judge
Markey found it apparent from the Christiansondecision that the Supreme Court
"did not intend to make a rigid application of the well-pleaded complaint rule a
Procrustean bed for this court's jurisdiction."12 Federal-state conflicts were not
present in Aerojet, Judge Markey emphasized; the appeals court dealt "only with the
direction of an appeal in a case already properly in the federal court system," and one
where the "plaintiffs right to choose a federal trial forum has already been fully
exercised."1 3 In light of the legislative history of the Federal Courts Improvement
Act of 1982, which gave birth to the Federal Circuit in order to make available "a
clear, stable, uniform basis for evaluating matters of patent validity/invalidity and
infringement/noninfringement," Judge Markey concluded in Aerojet that to read the
well-pleaded complaint rule as mandating "a compelled disregard of compulsory

5Id.
6 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 13(b).
7 Holmes Group, 122 S. Ct. at 1892 (noting that "Respondent's answer asserted a compulsory
counterclaim alleging patent infringement").
8 895 F.2d 736, 745 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (Markey, C.J., for a unanimous en bane court) (holding
that Federal Circuit, rather than regional circuit, had appellate jurisdiction over a Lanham Act
"false representation" case that included compulsory counterclaim for patent infringement, where
counterclaim was "a separate, nonfrivolous claim, having its own section 1338 jurisdictional basis
independent of the jurisdictional basis of the complaint").
9 170 F.3d 1354, 1358-59 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (holding that actions "arising under" the patent laws,
which trigger Federal Circuit's appellate jurisdiction, include permissive as well as compulsory
counterclaims that assert a nonfrivolous claim of patent infringement).
10Holmes Group, 122 S. Ct. at 1896 (Stevens, J., concurring) (citing Federal Circuit's decision
in Aerojet and regional circuit authority cited therein).
11486 U.S. 800 (1988).
12

Ae rojet, 895 F.2d at 741.

13Id. at 74445.
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counterclaims for patent infringement . . . would disserve the intent of Congress in
creating [the Federal Circuit].14
Writing for the Supreme Court in Holmes Group, Justice Scalia derides this
reasoning as an act of "interpretative necromancy." 15 The startling result of Holmes
Group is that for the first time since the Federal Circuit's creation twenty years ago,
the regional circuit courts of appeal will be asked to resolve patent law-based claims
(i.e., causes of action), not merely the occasional patent law-based issue that might be
tangentially encountered in non-patent actions. 16 The decision in Holmes Group
resurrects the specter of regional circuit-specific, non-uniform patent jurisprudence
and the potential for forum shopping that entails, the very problems that the Federal
Circuit was created to remedy. By narrowly construing statutory text and nonanalogous judicial decisions while purposefully ignoring the legislative intent
expressed in the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982,17 the Supreme Court in
Holmes Group has frustrated Congress's goal of creating a more uniform and stable
18
patent law jurisprudence.
Contrary to the Supreme Court's ruling in Holmes Group, this article contends
that when a plaintiff files a non-patent law-based claim in federal court (e.g., an
antitrust action, copyright infringement action, or Lanham Act trademark or trade
dress infringement action), and the defendant asserts a non-frivolous counterclaim
for patent infringement, the case should be construed as one "arising under" the
patent laws in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1338. Hence, any appeal from a final
decision should be taken to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit under

1' Id. at 745. Congress created the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in 1982 with
the goal of reducing forum shopping and enhancing uniformity in the development of patent law.
Although its first Chief Judge, Howard T. Markey, and others, objected to characterizations of the
court as a "specialized" forum, the Federal Circuit is unique among the U.S. Courts of Appeals
because its existence is premised on a specialized subject matter, rather than geographic,
jurisdiction.
15See Holmes Group,122 S. Ct. at 1895.
16"Claims" (or causes of action) should be distinguished from "issues." The Supreme Court has
previously made clear that the Federal Circuit does not have exclusive appellate jurisdiction over
cases raising patent issues that are not necessarily determinative of a non-patent law cause of
action. See Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 811-12 (establishing that a
non-patent claim involving a patent issue will go to the regional circuit rather than the Federal
Circuit if patent law is not a "necessary element" of the claim).
17Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (1982).
18 See H.R.Rep. No. 312, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 41 (1981) [hereafter House Report], at 20 ("The
establishment of a single court to hear patent appeals was repeatedly singled out by the witnesses
who appeared before the Committee as one of the most far-reaching reforms that could be made to
strengthen the United States patent system in such a way as to foster technological growth and
industrial innovation. The new Court of Appeals of the Federal Circuit will provide nationwide
uniformity in patent law, will make the rules applied in patent litigation more predictable and will
eliminate the expensive, time-consuming and unseemly forum-shopping that characterizes litigation
in the field."); see also S.Rep. No. 275, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 19-20 (1981) [hereafter Senate Report],
at 3-6, 29 ("The committee is concerned that the exclusive jurisdiction over patent claims of the new
Federal Circuit not be manipulated. This measure is intended to alleviate the serious problems of
forum shopping among the regional's [sic] courts of appeals on patent claims by investing exclusive
jurisdiction in one court of appeals."); House Report at 23 ("the central purpose [in creating the
Federal Circuit] is to reduce the widespread lack of uniformity and uncertainty of legal doctrine that
existed in the administration of patent law.").
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28 U.S.C. § 1295(a), on the basis that the district court's jurisdiction was based, "in
part" if not "inwhole," upon the patent laws.
This article concedes that if the plaintiff filed its action in state court (e.g., an
action for trade secret misappropriation without diversity of citizenship), the general
rule for removal of such cases should control, and the defendant should not be able to
remove the case to federal court by filing a patent infringement counterclaim. This
bifurcated approach ensures that Congress's goal of promoting a uniform, stable
patent law jurisprudence is honored in the majority of cases involving a patent law
counterclaim (the majority being those initially filed in federal court), while
recognizing that federalism concerns will outweigh that policy interest in the
relatively small number of cases where the plaintiff chooses state court as its
preferred trial forum.
After reviewing the Supreme Court's earlier application of the "well-pleaded
complaint" rule in Christianson, this article critiques the majority and two
concurring opinions in Holmes Group. The majority opinion of Justice Scalia
unwisely discounts the importance of Federal Circuit review of patent law-based
causes of action by relying on case law interpreting "arising under" in the setting of
removal of cases from state to federal court, a context of no relevance to the facts in
Holmes Group. The tone of Justice Stevens' concurring opinion suggests that the
Court may have intended to rein in the Federal Circuit's recent choice-of-law trend
towards applying its own law, rather than that of the relevant regional circuit, to
non-patent law issues that intersect with or implicate patent law. Regardless of the
wisdom of the Federal Circuit's recent choice-of-law decisions, this article concludes
that Holmes Group's reliance on a formalistic "claim" versus "counterclaim"
distinction to strip away an entire category of patent law-based claims from the
Federal Circuit's appellate jurisdiction is not in the best interests of the U.S. patent
system, nor does it promote the efficient functioning of the federal appellate court
system.

THE SUPREME COURT'S FIRST FORAY INTO FEDERAL CIRCUIT JURISDICTION:
CHRISTIANSON V. COLT INDUS. (1988) AND THE WELL-PLEADED COMPLAINT RULE

The Supreme Court in Christiansonv. Colt Indus.1 9 was called upon to interpret
the meaning of "arising under" as used in 28 U.S.C. § 1338 when the plaintiff
Christianson filed a federal lawsuit alleging antitrust violations (as well as state lawbased tortious misrepresentation) by defendant Colt, a patent owner. Unlike Holmes
Group, no patent law-based counterclaim was involved in Christianson. Rather, the
central issue was whether patent law was "a necessary element of one of the
'20
[plaintiff's] well-pleaded [antitrust] claims.
More particularly, the antitrust claim was premised on defendant Colt's alleged
statements to current and potential customers of plaintiff Christianson that
Christianson was misappropriating Colt's trade secrets, which statements
Christianson alleged had caused a loss of business that ultimately drove
Christianson out of business. Colt contended that the alleged invalidity of its patents
19486 U.S. 800 (1988).
20 See id. at 809.
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was an essential element to plaintiff Christianson's Sherman Act monopolization
claim, thus making the case one that "arises under" the patent laws in accordance
with 28 U.S.C. § 1338 and therefore appealable to the Federal Circuit under 28
U.S.C. § 1295(a). A "jurisdictional ping-pong match" ensued in which the Federal
Circuit transferred the appeal to the Seventh Circuit, the Seventh Circuit transferred
' 21
it back, and the Federal Circuit finally decided the case in "the interest of justice,"
still contending that the appeal properly belonged in the Seventh Circuit.
Granting certiorarito resolve the dispute, the Supreme Court in Christianson
construed § 1338 "arising under" jurisdiction in terms of the "well-pleaded complaint
rule," which had long been established in the § 1331 context of cases involving
attempts to remove disputes from state to federal court on federal question grounds.
The Court determined "linguistic consistency" required a parallel approach to the
well-pleaded complaint rule as applied in patent cases. 22 A case "arises under" the
federal patent law, and thus is appealed to the Federal Circuit rather than the
applicable regional circuit, if "a well-pleaded complaint establishes either that federal
patent law creates the cause of action or that the plaintiffs right to relief necessarily
depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal patent law, in that patent
law is a necessary element of one of the well-pleaded claims."

23

Christianson is an important case for this elucidation of the well-pleaded
complaint rule in the patent law context but is of little applicability to the very
different facts of Holmes Group. No patent law-based defense or counterclaim was
asserted in Chriqtianson. The facts of Christianqon only addressed whether the
plaintiffs eomplaint made clear that its right to relief "necessarily depend[ed] on
resolution of a substantial question of federal patent law, in that patent law is a
necessary element of one of the well-pleaded claims."

24

The Court concluded in

Christiansonthat patent invalidity was only one out of several disparate theories in
support of the plaintiffs antitrust claim, and that this was an insufficient basis to
justify directing the appeal to the Federal Circuit.
Despite the fundamental factual distinctions between Christianson and
Holmes Group, the seeds of respondent Vornado's jurisdictional defeat were most
likely sown in the rather vague wording of footnote two of Christianson, raised
several times by the Justices during the Holmes Group oral argument. That footnote
stated:
[Respondent/patentee] Colt correctly points out that in this case our
interpretation of § 1338(a)'s "arising under" language will merely determine
which of two federal appellate courts will decide the appeal, and suggests
that our "arising under" jurisprudence might therefore be inapposite.
Since, however, § 1338(a) delineates the jurisdiction of the federal and state
courts over cases involving patent issues, the phrase (like the identical
phrase in § 1331) "masks a welter of issues regarding the interrelation of
federal and state authority and the proper management of the federal
judicial system." See Franchise Tax Board of California v. Construction
Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 8, 77 L. Ed. 2d 420, 103 S. Ct. 2841
21 Jd.at

807.

22 Id. at
23 Id. at
24 Id. at

808.
808-09.
809.
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(1983) (footnote omitted). See also Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc. v.
Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 810, 92 L. Ed. 2d 650, 106 S. Ct. 3229 (1986)
("Determinations about federal jurisdiction require sensitive judgments
about congressional intent, judicial power, and the federal system").25
The Holmes Group majority's concern with footnote two of Christianson is
overstated. The footnote's federalism focus is of little relevance to the procedural
context of both Holmes Group and Christianson. Neither case involved an action
first filed in state court; both were actions initially brought in federal district court.

THE SUPREME COURT CONSIDERS PATENT INFRINGEMENT COUNTERCLAIMS: HOLMES
GROUP, INC. V. VORNADO AIR CIRCULATION SYS., INC. (2002)

The facts of Holmes Group are rather convoluted, but the essential procedural
nugget is that the case was in federal court from the beginning. No state-federal
conflict was presented. Nevertheless, the Court in Holmes Group exclusively applied
case law interpreting § 1331's "arising under" terminology in the context of
attempted removals from state to federal court to conclude that appeal had been
taken to the wrong federal appellate forum.
Holmes Group commenced with the filing of an action by the petitioner Holmes
Group in the U.S. District Court for the District of Kansas, seeking a declaratory
judgment that it did not infringe upon respondent Vornado's trade dress under the
federal trademark laws. Vornado filed an answer that included a compulsory
counterclaim of patent infringement. The Kansas district court granted summary
judgment to Holmes Group on the trade dress issue and stayed any consideration of
Vornado's patent infringement counterclaim while the trade dress issue was on
appeal. Vornado filed its appeal with the Federal Circuit. The Federal Circuit took
jurisdiction in accordance with the rule of Aerojet, vacated the district court's
decision of no trade dress infringement, and remanded the case for reconsideration of
whether the "change in the law" exception to collateral estoppel applied in light of the
Supreme Court's intervening decision on product configuration functionality in
TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc.2 6 The Supreme Court granted
certiorarito consider whether the Federal Circuit properly asserted jurisdiction over
the appeal.
Writing for the Supreme Court majority in Holmes Group, Justice Scalia gave
short shrift to the Congressional intent underlying the creation of the Federal
Circuit. "Our task here," he wrote, "is not to determine what would further
Congress's goal of ensuring patent-law uniformity, but to determine what the words
of the statute must fairly be understood to mean."27 Justice Scalia "decline[d] to
transform the longstanding well-pleaded-complaint rule into the 'well-pleadedcomplaint-or-counterclaim rule' urged by respondent" 28 Vornado and consistently

25
26
27
28

Id. at 808 n.2.
532 U.S. 23 (2001).
Holmes Group, 122 S. Ct. at 1895.
Id. at 1894.
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applied by the Federal Circuit since its 1990 Aerojet decision, characterizing such a
'
ruling as an "unprecedented feat of interpretive necromancy. 29
Justice Scalia's primary concern with the respondent's proposed rule was the
possibility that a defendant in a case brought in state court would be able to remove
it to federal court by asserting a counterclaim for patent infringement, thus
"radically expand[ing] the class of removable cases." 30 The key language in Justice
Scalia's opinion relies on cases and commentary that involved an attempt to remove a
case from state to federal court by virtue of a federal counterclaim:
[O]ur prior cases .... were decided on the principle that federal jurisdiction
generally exists "only when a federal question is presented on the face of the
plaintiffs properly pleaded complaint." CaterpillarInc. v. Williams, 482
U.S. 386, 392 (1987) (emphasis added). As we said in The Fair v. Kohler
Die & Specialty Co., 228 U.S. 22, 25, 57 L. Ed. 716, 33 S. Ct. 410, 1913 Dec.
Comm'r Pat. 530 (1913), whether a case arises under federal patent law
"cannot depend upon the answer." Moreover, we have declined to adopt
proposals that "the answer as well as the complaint ...

be consulted before

a determination [is] made whether the case 'arises under' federal law .... "
Franchise Tax Bd. of Ca]. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust for
Southern Cal., 463 U.S. 1, 10-11, n. 9 (1983) (citing American Law Institute,
Study of the Division of Jurisdiction Between State and Federal Courts §
1312, pp. 188-194 (1969)). It follows that a counterclaim -- which appears
as part of the defendant's answer, not as part of the plaintiffs complaint -cannot serve as the basis for "arising under" jurisdiction. See, e.g., In re
Adams, 809 F.2d 1187, 1188, n. 1 (CA5 1987); FDIC v. Elefant, 790 F.2d
661, 667 (CA7 1986); Takeda v. Northwestern National Life Ins. Co., 765
F.2d 815, 822 (CA9 1985); 14B C. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper, Federal
Practice and Procedure § 3722, pp. 402-414 (3d ed. 1998).31
Notably, each of the authorities relied on by Justice Scalia in this portion of the
Holmes Group opinion turned on federalism concerns, Le., holding that a defendant
should not be able to raise a federal issue in a counterclaim for the purpose of
removing an action originally brought in state court to federal court.3 2 However,
29 Id. (opining that it "would be an unprecedented feat of interpretive necromancy to say that §
1338(a)'s 'arising under' language means one thing (the well-pleaded-complaint rule) in its own
right, but something quite different (respondent's complaint-or-counterclaim rule) when referred to
by § 1295(a)(1)").
30 Id. at 1894.
31 Id. at 1893-94.
'32 In re Adams, 809 F.2d 1187, 1188, n. 1 (5th Cir. 1987) (affirming federal district court's
holding that appellant's counterclaims, based on federal antitrust law, were unavailing to compel
federal court jurisdiction in lawsuit filed in state court but later removed to federal Bankruptcy
court,); FDIC v. Elefant, 790 F.2d 661, 667 (7th Cir. 1986) (remanding case to state court in which
FDIC sued as receiver for bank under state law, and noting "[t]hat something happened later, such
as the filing of a counterclaim based on federal law, does not make the suit removable"); Takeda v.
Northwestern National Life Ins. Co., 765 F.2d 815, 822 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding in breach of contract
case that removal jurisdiction did not exist where "[p]laintiffs sued under state law; they did not
allege that their claims were based on federal law" and "[t]he federal question defendants raise in
their counterclaims does not provide a basis for removal"); 14B C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER, & E.
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federalism concerns play no part in cases already in the federal system by virtue of a
federal question in the complaint, for instance antitrust claims or federal non-patent
intellectual property claims such as copyright or Lanham Act section 43(a) trade
dress infringement claims. As stated by Justice Ginsburg, who concurred only in the
Holmes Group judgment, the majority opinion of Justice Scalia "dwells on district
33
court authority ... [b]ut, all agree, Congress left that authority entirely untouched"
when it created the Federal Circuit.
Justice Scalia was plainly concerned about the potential impact of the Court's
decision beyond the patent law realm, and it is most likely that concern that led to
the Court's literalistic ruling. The following oral argument colloquy with respondent
Vornado's counsel reveals the Court's discomfort with the possibility of its decision
sweeping beyond patent cases:
Counsel:
[Tihere is no issue of federalism here.
The-the petitioner
properly brought a case in-in the Federal district court in Kansas.
Court: Then you're-you're now defeating your first concession which was
with footnote 2 in Aerojet, that we are to deal with this case exactly as if it
were a removal case because it's a question of all Federal jurisdiction, not
just patent. The word is arising under. That's in fact-I flag it because
that's what frightens me. I thought if all that were at issue here were
patent cases, we weren't going to make a big mistake either way.
Counsel: Well-[Laughter.]
Court: But once you tell me that this involves all cases of removal, I
suddenly get quite nervous about departing from well-settled law.
Counsel: Then-then I must retract it. It does not-it does not involve all
cases of removal. This is a patent case, and-and I think we're talking
about patent issues and whether the Federal Circuit has proper jurisdiction
of claims in a case involving patent issues.
Court: Well, that means that we interpret, under your view, "arising
under" in different ways in the-in the patent statute [28 U.S.C. § 1338]
4
and in-in the Federal [question] jurisdiction statute [28 U.S.C. § 1331].3

ed. 1998) (stating in treatise
section on removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1441 that "[the federal claim or right that provides the
COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3722, pp. 402-14 (3d

predicate for removal to federal court must not be asserted as part of an issue that is merely
collateral or incidental to a claim that is primarily based in state law . . .. nor can the federal
question appear for the first time in the defendant's answer by way of defense .... nor is it sufficient
for the federal question to enter the case as a counterclaim asserted by the defendant.)
(footnotes
and citations omitted).
33 Holmes Group, 122 S. Ct. at 1898 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in judgment).
34 Supreme Court Oral Argument Transcript, Holmes Group., Inc. v. Vornado Air Circ. Sys.,

Inc. (3/19/02), available at
http ://a257.g.akamaitech.net/7/257/2422/18apr20021445/www.supremecourtus.gov/oral-arguments/
argument transcripts/01-408.pdf (visited Oct. 23, 2002) [hereinafter "Oral Argument Transcript"],
at 32-33.
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There is no dispute that the phrase "arising under," as used in 28 U.S.C. § 1338,
also appears in 28 U.S.C. § 1331, the general federal question subject matter
jurisdiction provision, and that the legislative history of the Federal Circuit's
jurisdictional provision supports a parallel interpretive focus. 35 Generally accepted
principles of statutory construction would, admittedly, support the consistent
interpretation of the same language in two different sections of the same statutory
title, even when one section specifically deals with patent cases and the other with
state-federal conflicts. The Federal Circuit faced an analogous scenario in VE
Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance Co.,36 where the issue was whether
Congress's 1988 amendment of subsection [c]of the general federal venue statute, 28
U.S.C. § 1391, to define a corporation's residence as including anywhere that it is
subject to personal jurisdiction, should be read as having redefined the meaning of
"resides" in the specific patent venue provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b). Such a
reading would broaden the potential venues for patent infringement litigation,
because previous Supreme Court decisions had interpreted venue for corporate
defendants in patent cases under § 1400(b) as being limited to the state of
incorporation. The Federal Circuit in VE Holdings was ultimately persuaded that
the new, broader definition of corporate residence should be applied in patent cases,
in light of Congress's use of the "classic language of incorporation" (i.e., § 1391's
preamble phrase, "as defined in this chaptei'), and the failure of the relevant
legislative history to make any special recognition of patent cases.
The determinative difference in Holmes Group, however, is that 28 U.S.C. §
1338 must be read in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a), which inextricably links
the two provisions for purposes of determining the Federal Circuit's appellate
jurisdiction.
That jurisdiction simply cannot be defined without reference to
Congress's purpose in creating the Federal Circuit in 1982-the formation of one
central appellate forum that would decide patent appeals from all U.S. federal
district courts.
Entirely different concerns pervade the issue of federal question jurisdiction-whether a case "arises under" federal rather than state law--under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
The law is clear that a defendant in a case filed in state court cannot seek to remove
it to federal court based on the presentation of a federal question in the defendant's
answer or counterclaim. 37 The underlying policy is respect for state sovereignty and
preservation of stable federal-state relations. That policy concern should not have
controlled the result in Holmes Group. As one Justice responded to counsel's oral
argument that "arising under" must be interpreted the same way in both the 28
U.S.C. § 1331 and § 1338 contexts:
[I]n the context where there's a great concern about Federal-State relations,
cases lodged in the State court being lifted out of that State court and put
into a Federal court, this context is totally different. It is an entirely
3, See Chiristianson,486 U.S. at 814 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 97-312 (1981), at 41 (stating that
cases fall within the Federal Circuit's patent jurisdiction "in the same sense that cases are said to
'arise under' federal law for purposes of federal question jurisdiction")).
36 917 F.2d 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
37 See supra note 32.
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Federal context, and it's a question of which appellate forum it goes to. And
it seems to me that you can't just say that what "arising under" means in
the original jurisdiction context it necessarily means when we're talking
about an exclusive appellate forum for a case that's colored Federal totally.
There's no State element in it.38

JUSTICE GINSBURG'S CONCURRENCE IN HOLMES GROUP

Justice Ginsburg concurred only in the Holmes Group judgment and wrote
separately, joined by Justice O'Connor. These Justices concluded that "when the
claim stated in a compulsory counterclaim 'arises under' federal patent law and is
adjudicated on the merits by a federal district court, the Federal Circuit has
exclusive appellate jurisdiction over that adjudication and other determinations
39
made in the same case."
Justices Ginsburg and O'Connor joined the majority's judgment for one reason
only: that the patent counterclaim had never been adjudicated on the merits by the
district court in this particular case. 40
Rather, the district court stayed all
proceedings relating to the patent law counterclaim and indicated that the patent
counterclaim would be dismissed if the declaratory judgment of no trade dress
infringement was affirmed on appeal. 41
Had the patent counterclaim been
adjudicated on the merits, it seems clear that at least Justices Ginsburg and
O'Connor would have dissented in Holmes Group.

JUSTICE STEVENS' CONCURRENCE IN HOLMES GROUP

Justice Stevens scolded Justice Scalia for slighting "well-reasoned precedent"
such as Judge Markey's opinion for the Federal Circuit in Aerojet,42 which
interpreted the "in whole or in part" language of § 1295(a)(1) to encompass patent
infringement claims asserted in a compulsory counterclaim.
Justice Stevens
nevertheless agreed with Justice Scalia that the Holmes Group appeal did not belong
in the Federal Circuit on the basis of three policy reasons. First, Justice Stevens
contended that a plaintiffs interest in choosing a forum includes not only the trial
court but also the court that will hear the appeal. Moreover, Justice Stevens
suggested that because claims sounding in other areas of intellectual property law
(such as trademark and copyright law) are "not infrequently bound up with" patent
law counterclaims, permitting the interpretation of § 1295 sought by respondent
Vornado might direct a "significant" number of cases to the Federal Circuit that
38 Oral

Argument Transcript, supra note 34, at 12.

122 S. Ct. at 1898 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in judgment).
40 See id.
41 See id. at 1892.
42 895 F.2d 736, 742-43 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (en banc) (Markey, C.J., for a unanimous court) (citing,
e.g., Rengo Co. v. Molins Machine Co., 657 F.2d 535, 539 (3d Cir. 1981); Dale Electronics, Inc. v. R.
C. L. Electronics, Inc., 488 F.2d 382, 390 (1st Cir. 1973); Pioche Mines Consol., Inc. v. FidelityPhiladelphia Trust Co., 206 F.2d 336, 336-337 (9th Cir. 1953); Lion Mfg. Corp. v. Chicago Flexible
Shaft Co., 106 F.2d 930, 933 (7th Cir. 1939)).
3)
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Congress "specifically chose not to place within its exclusive jurisdiction."43 Lastly,
Justice Stevens cited the interest "in maintaining clarity and simplicity in rules
governing appellate jurisdiction" 44 that would be served by limiting the number of
pleadings that will mandate Federal Circuit review.
Whatever the weight of these observations, of much greater interest to
Federal Circuit watchers is Justice Stevens' rather pointed suggestion that having
the regional circuits occasionally decide appeals containing patent law-based causes
of action would exert a healthy influence on the patent system. The language of the
Stevens opinion can be interpreted as supporting a view that the Federal Circuit is a
specialized court in need of some antidote for pro-patentee bias or insular thinking:
[W]e have already decided that the Federal Circuit does not have exclusive
jurisdiction over all cases raising patent issues ....
Christianson, 486 U.S.,
at 811-812. Necessarily, therefore, other circuits will have some role to play
in the development of this area of the law. An occasional conflict in
decisions may be useful in identifying questions that merit this Court's
attention. Moreover, occasional decisions by courts with broader jurisdiction
will provide an antidote to the risk that the specialized court may develop

an institutional bias.

.... 45

Similar views recently surfaced in the Federal Trade Commission and
Department of Justice joint hearings on competition law and intellectual property
policy. 46 For example, the American Bar Association's Section on Antitrust Law
prepared for those hearings a Report on the United States Court of Appeals for the
FederalCircuit.47 The report's preparation was sparked in large part by a statement
in the amicus curiae brief of the United States opposing certiorari in CSU LLC v.
Xerox Corp., 203 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2000), suggesting that "the Court allow the]
difficult issues [in that case] to percolate further in the Courts of Appeals." There
was a perception among some observers that, given the Federal Circuit's expanding
view with respect to its own jurisdiction, regional courts of appeals might never
48
consider the patent-antitrust issues raised in CSUand other cases.
The Holmes Group decision issued during preparation of the Antitrust Section's
Report. The report's authors suggest, with apparent relief, that "while [Holmes
Group] did not involve an antitrust claim, its effect on the Federal Circuit's role in
the development of antitrust law is potentially significant."
The tone of Justice Stevens' concurring opinion in Holmes Group suggests
that the Court may have intended to rein in the Federal Circuit's choice-of-law trend

43

Holmes Group, 122 S. Ct. at 1897.

44 Id.

4, Id. at 1897-98 (footnotes omitted).
46 See Federal Trade Commission, Public Hearing Materials, Competition and Intellectual
Property Law and Policy in the Knowledge-Based Economy (2002), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/opp/intellect/index.htm (visited Oct. 23, 2002).
47 Section of Antitrust Law, American Bar Association, Report on the United States Court of
Appeals
for
the
Federal
Circuit
(July
2002),
available
at
http://www.ftc.gov/opp/intellect/O207salabarpt.pdf (visited Oct. 23, 2002).

48 Id. at 2.
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towards applying its own law, rather than that of the relevant regional circuit, on
non-patent issues bound up with patent law, as in the CSU v. Xerox antitrust case.
Indeed, the trade dress dispute at the heart of Holmes Group reflects the Federal
Circuit's disagreement with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit's
reasoning in Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc. v. Duracraft Corp. (Vornado I),49 in
which the Tenth Circuit found that Vornado had no protectible trade dress rights in
its spiral grill design for fans. In Midwest Indus., Inc. v. Karavan Trailers,Inc.,50 the
Federal Circuit flatly rejected the Tenth Circuit's Vornado I view that "trade dress
protection is unavailable for a product configuration that is claimed in a patent and
is a 'described, significant inventive aspect' of the patented invention, even if the
configuration is nonfunctional,"51 and chose to apply its own law on the trade dress
issue. The district court in Holmes Group rejected respondent Vornado's argument
that Midwest Industriesrepresented a change in the law that warranted relitigation
of its trade dress claim. 52 On appeal, however, the Federal Circuit in Holmes Group
vacated the district court's judgment and remanded 53 for consideration of the
Supreme Court's decision on trade dress functionality in TrafFix Devices, Inc. v.
Marketing Displays, Inc. 54 Interpreting his take on this procedural history, counsel
for the petitioner, James W. Dabney, contended at the Supreme Court oral argument
that:
[s]ince Aerojet in 1989, there has been a sea change in the Federal
Circuit's approach to what law it chooses to apply in cases such as this, and
it is the Federal Circuit's choice of law approach, adopted in the late 1990's,
55
which has given birth to this entire action.
And the Federal Circuit, being a co-equal court of appeals, is fully
entitled, I suppose, to fashion its own liability rules and apply them even to
claims over which it has only nonexclusive or pendent jurisdiction. But by
doing that, it has given rise to great incentives, which the respondent has
attempted to avail itself of in this case, to get a case into the Federal Circuit
and take advantage of the different law of the Federal Circuit on a non56
patent claim.
Justice Stevens' concurring opinion, read in light of the colloquy at oral
argument, suggests that at least some members of the Supreme Court saw Holmes
Group as a means of restraining the Federal Circuit from a perceived improper
expansion of its authority through the Federal Circuit's recent choice-of-law
jurisprudence.

4958 F.3d 1498 (10th Cir. 1995) ( Vornado 1).

50175 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
51Id. at 1364 (citing Vornado j 58 F.3d at 1510).
52 See Holmes Group, 122 S. Ct. at 1892.
53 See Order, Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 13 Fed. Appx. 961 (Fed.
Cir. June 5, 2001).
54 532 U.S. 23 (2001).
55 Oral Argument Transcript, supra note 34, at 14.
56 Id. at 15.
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PRACTICAL IMPACT OF THE SUPREME COURT'S HOLMES GROUPDECISION

The number of cases in which the regional circuit courts of appeal will now, postHolmes Group, be obliged to decide patent law causes of action is most likely few in
number. However, these cases can be relatively high-profile. For example, the
controversial CSU v. Xerox decision, in which the Federal Circuit recently rejected
the notion of an obligation to license on the part of a patent owner, was an antitrust
case in which the defendant Xerox filed a patent infringement counterclaim. If tried
today, the case would go to the Tenth Circuit rather than the Federal Circuit. What
does the Supreme Court's decision in Holmes Group suggest about the precedential
57
force of the Federal Circuit's CSUdecision?
For that matter, what does Holmes Group say about the rationale underlying
the Supreme Court's own 1993 decision in CardinalChem. Co. v. Morton Int'l, Inc. .5
That case held that the Federal Circuit should not maintain its earlier practice of
vacating patent invalidity judgments after having reached a determination of noninfringement. Recall that CardinalChemicalwas a case in which the issue of patent
invalidity was raised as a counterclaim for a declaratory judgment of invalidity. The
Court in Cardinal Chemical recognized the importance of an independent
determination of patent validity and review thereof by the Federal Circuit, stating:
A party seeking a declaratory judgment of invalidity presents a claim
independent of the patentee's charge of infringement. If the District Court
has jurisdiction (established independently from its jurisdiction over the
patentee's charge of infringement) to consider that claim, so does (barring
59
any intervening events) the FederalCircuit.
Even though the number of non-patent cases raising patent infringement
counterclaims may be relatively small, they will nevertheless present a challenge for
the regional appellate courts, which have not had to resolve patent-based causes of
action since 1982. For example, what authority should the regional circuits consider
to be binding precedent in such cases? Should the regional circuits now resurrect
and apply their own pre-1982 patent case law when it conflicts with post-1982
Federal Circuit decisions? In a recent article for The Recorder, reporter Brenda
Sandburg quotes Edward Reines, a partner at Well, Gotshal & Manges' Redwood
Shores, California, office, as stating that Holmes Group will place additional burdens
on appellate judges: "The clear losers in this case are the appellate judges around
the country who thought that with the creation of the Federal Circuit they would not
have to hear another patent case -- with all the esoteric questions of law and
57 Another recent antitrust case in which a patent infringement counterclaim resulted in
appeal initially being taken to the Federal Circuit is Telcomm Tech. Servs., Inc. v. Siemens Rolm
Communs., Inc., 295 F.3d 1249 (Fed. Cir. July 2, 2002). The Federal Circuit did not reach the
merits and instead transferred the appeal to the Eleventh Circuit in light of the Supreme Court's
intervening decision in Holmes Group.
58 508 U.S. 83 (1993).
59 Id. at 96 (emphasis added). The distinction between CardinalChemical and Holmes Group
is, of course, that the plaintiff in Cardinal Chemicalhad asserted a claim of patent infringement in
its complaint, filed in federal district court. See id. at 85-86. Thus no issue was presented of
whether the appeal would go to the Federal Circuit rather than a regional circuit court of appeals.
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technology that tend to come with them.' 60 According to Reines, "additional losers
are the attorneys in the country who now have to become familiar with patent
decisions in all 11 [sic] regional circuits, in addition to the decisions of the Federal
61
Circuit."

CONCLUSION

In excluding patent infringement counterclaims from those cases that trigger
Federal Circuit appellate jurisdiction, the Supreme Court in Holmes Group exalted
textual literalism over prudent patent policy. The Court failed to heed its own
guidance, recently provided in Festo v. Shoketsu, 62 in which it recognized that patent
cases present a complex balancing of policy concerns that should not be swept aside
in a quest for bright-line rules: "the clearest rule of patent interpretation, literalism,
63
may conserve judicial resources but is not necessarily the most efficient rule."
No interpretive magic is necessary to conclude that Judge Markey reached the
better-reasoned result in Aerojet. So long as a case is originally brought in federal
court, a non-frivolous patent infringement counterclaim should direct the appeal to
the Federal Circuit. Whether or not the Supreme Court intended Holmes Group as
criticism of the Federal Circuit's recent choice-of-law decision-making, Holmes
Group's cramped reading of 28 U.S.C. § 1338 "arising under" jurisdiction and the
well-pleaded complaint rule was an unfortunately blunt instrument with which to
cabin the Federal Circuit's Congressionally-mandated role as the source of uniform
and stable U.S. patent law jurisprudence.

6o Brenda Sandburg, US. Suprome Court Limits Reach ofFodoral Circuit,THE RECORDER
(June 6, 2002), available at
http ://www.law.com/jsp/printerfriendly.jsp?c=LawArticle&t=PrinterFriendlyArticle&cid= 102295428
5185 (last visited, Nov. 1, 2002).
(31
Id.
(2 122 S. Ct. 1831 (2002) (rejecting Federal Circuit's "complete bar" rule of prosecution history
estoppel).
( Id. at 1837.
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